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WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM COMPARING MEDIATION 
ACROSS LEVELS 
Tom W. Milburn 
  
  
The worlds of international and interpersonal mediation rarely intersect. Practitioners do not 
interact with one another; scholarly commentaries on mediation in one sector seldom cite 
material from the other sector. This tendency to treat each sector as an independent preserve 
diminishes the potential to develop new insights for mediation theory and practice. Many 
insights might come from "thinking outside the box" of assumptions imposed by conventional 
practice.  
To what extent are the international mediation processes and interpersonal mediation processes 
similar or dissimilar? What can scholars learn from comparing them? Can mediators of 
international conflicts learn from examining the mediation of interpersonal disputes, and can 
mediators of interpersonal disputes profit from learning about mediation in international 
contexts? How do we approach the comparison?  
In the following pages we shall attempt to suggest the potential of such comparisons by focusing 
on several fairly conventional dimensions. For each dimension we ask what the implications of 
the differences and similarities are. We will focus on the characteristics of disputants, the nature 
of effective mediators, aspects of the process, some of the subtleties of mediation and the success 
of using these in enforcing settlements.  
  
Social Context of Disputing 
Mediation in some form has served as the central method of conflict management in small-scale 
societies the world-over (Merry, 1982, 1989). It appears to have primacy in societies where 
hierarchical and differentiated government and legal systems do not exist. Equally important, 
interdependent community members locked together in continuing relationships find mediation 
useful in reducing the costs of conflict to the community. Increasingly, members of the global 
community as well as local communities have perceived themselves as interdependent and thus 
likely to be influenced by what happens within their venues. A collection of ways to aid in the 
resolution of disputes can prove useful to any level of community.  
  
The Disputants 
Disputants are sometimes divided into complainants and respondent, the initiators of and 
responders to conflictual action, but disputant is the generic term. Disputants may negotiate with 
one another or their representatives may do so for them. Both disputing and mediation take 
different forms and have different meanings depending on whether or not principals or 
representatives are involved. The roles of principals and representatives are further complicated 
by whether the disputants are individuals or groups or states. When individuals engage 
inmediation they often represent themselves, but on occasion they have lawyers or other 
advocates appear with or instead of them. Nation states and groups, unless they are very small, 
must be represented in mediation by individuals in positions of authority. There are times when 
group leaders such as Chief Executive -Officers (CEOs) or dictators may have such authority in 
their groups that they embody the group in their person. Representatives play important roles in 
international mediation, but they may account for little in interpersonal mediation except in those 
cases where attorneys represent parties.  
From the standpoint of mediation, the two questions regarding the role of representatives are 
whether a representative has binding authority to make agreements and whether a representative 
is able to "sell" the agreement to the group or individuals he or she represents. Principals can 
make binding decisions and need not make explicit the rationales for their agreements. When 
rationales are not articulated, the logic of internal justification can be loose and inconsistent in a 
way that articulated rationales cannot be. On the other hand, the need either to sell or justify an 
agreement to a larger audience creates a special burden for mediation. That need is compounded 
if a group must formally approve any agreement.  
A gap can grow between the experience and perspectives of representatives in mediation and of 
their constituents or constituencies. Since the constituents seldom have direct contact with the 
"other side" or with the shifting definitions and understandings that emerge through the 
mediation process, how can constituents possibly "keep up"? In interpersonal mediation with 
individuals the solution is relatively easy and complete: the represented party can attend and 
participate in the mediation process itself. In international mediation this solution obviously is 
impossible. Other routes are taken to apprise nonparticipants of progress. But the more important 
the approval of those outsiders, the more thorough these updates must be.  
The potential for gaps to grow between representatives and their constituencies raises interesting 
questions about the privacy or secrecy of mediation sessions. In order to keep constituencies up 
to date, much of the content of mediation discussions, especially the step-bystep or staged 
agreements, should be made public. In fact, the organization of steps for release of information to 
constituencies may be among the most important parts of the mediation process. When 
individuals are directly involved or when representatives embody the organization, such 
concerns, of course, do not arise.  
The existence of an agent who represents a principal often means that each party follows a 
scenario and thus has much less discretion in arriving at an agreement than does a principal. The 
relationship between principals and agents tends to be similar in mediations between states and 
in mediation between individuals. However, in international mediation, there usually are several 
levels of representatives and others who instruct the representatives. In a dispute between 
individuals where an attorney represents each principal, that attorney typically must check back 
with the client before any final agreement can be made. Similarly, representatives of 
governments must check frequently with their political superiors, often after every negotiating 
session.  
Summit meetings between world leaders have principals as leading actors in negotiating 
processes. Thus these meetings do not follow standard procedure in negotiating international 
agreements, where governmental representatives must negotiate with other agencies within their 
own governments as well as with one another. In the 1977 Camp David mediation arranged by 
President Jimmy Carter, Carter mediated a complex set of disputes between Israel's Menachem 
Begin and Egypt's Anwar Sadat. Begin and Sadat served as principals in the negotiation, 
although their staffs were sometimes present as well and some staff members occasionally acted 
as their representatives.  
Concerns of face, honor, and status may be particularly important to each party in a dispute 
between states, thus increasing the rigidity of their positions and their consequent intransigence 
in moving toward agreements. States may look and plan farther in the future than do individuals. 
Certainly the stakes at issue may be particularly weighty in conflicts between states and often the 
issues far more complex.  
  
Power Asymmetry 
In both interpersonal and international mediation there can be an imbalance of power between 
disputants which creates special problems for mediators (Milbum & Klimoski, 1996). There 
were, for example, asymmetries in the Israel-Egypt mediations. Israel was militarily, 
economically, and politically more powerful than Egypt, yet Sadat's position was a more 
powerful one within the goverm-nent of Egypt than was Begin's within the Israeli government. 
Begin frequently observed that he had to get his agreements supported by his cabinet and by the 
Israeli Knesset, a democratic process which arrived at crucial decisions slowly. Of course, once 
given his government's support, Begin's position was very strong indeed. Sadat's power 
permitted him to make decisions on his own, but Arab opposition to his actions led to his 
assassination (Carter, 1982; Bercovitch, 1986; Telhami, 1990).  
This mediation suggests the complexity of the mix among the variables of concern here. 
International disputes between heads of state with final decision-making authority may resemble 
more closely interpersonal mediation. Personal rapport or antipathy, ego, and perceptions of 
slight or insult may play a much larger role in relation to the substantive issues than they do 
when representatives are involved. It is often the case that mediators feel some need to decrease 
the power differences between disputants so that neither is in a position to overwhelm the other. 
Power asymmetry is usually greater in international mediation; so the international mediator has 
a larger role in balancing power and acting to decrease power asymmetry than does the 
interpersonal mediator. International mediation is thus more like labor management mediation 
where the mediators accept power imbalances as part of the reality with which they must deal. In 




There are generic aspects to the mediation process and mediator characteristics that tend to 
remain similar across societal levels and sectors. To function well as a mediator, that person 
ought to have some sense of similarities and differences in issues and in necessary skills and 
procedures. The mediator must learn what the disputants consider the central factors of their 
dispute. This means the mediator must grasp how the dispute got started and the direction it is 
moving. The mediator must actively listen to each disputant, one at a time, and then attempt to 
elicit one or more significant factors of cognitive and affective interest to both disputants. Such 
must be done before the mediator can begin to help disputants explore ways to resolve and, 
perhaps, to settle the dispute. In the process a new contract is created in which the next steps are 
articulated clearly and agreed upon by all.  
At least three characteristics of mediators can contribute to their effectiveness: the status of the 
mediator vis-a-vis disputing parties; the mediator's neutrality; and the power of the mediator vis-
a-vis the parties. Central to most discussions of interpersonal mediation is the contention that the 
mediator should be a "neutral outsider." Yet in international disputes such a view does not accord 
with the common use of highly interested parties as mediators. Often representatives of powerful 
forces serve as mediators. For example, in the Camp David meetings, President Carter 
functioned as a powerful, high status, active mediator with his own agenda. It was and still is to 
America's advantage and to the advantage of U.S. presidents to increase the prospects for peace 
in the Middle East in order to protect our alliance with Israel and our sources of Arab oil. Under 
such circumstances it would be difficult for a president to remain altogether neutral. In spite of 
what could be seen as lack of neutrality, however, President Carter managed to be effective. 
Many small scale societies use knowledgeable and interested, but not necessarily neutral, 
community elders as mediators (Merry, 1982, 1989).  
The status of the mediator appears important for several reasons. The status of the mediator 
promotes the confidence of the parties and their willingness to participate, it gives the mediator 
leverage, and it permits the mediator to assert control over the process. Although mediators often 
insist that they have no authority to impose agreements on parties, their authority must be 
sufficient to direct and monitor the process. The mediator may remind the disputants that they 
have agreed to procedural rules, may set deadlines, and may demand that parties work long 
hours. To have this authority, the mediator must have sufficient status in relation to the parties.  
Status typically derives from community or public standing; from the auspices of sponsorship (a 
court, a recognized private agency, or a powerful nation); from an elevated position within a 
societal or governmental hierarchy; from appropriate training in mediation or a related course of 
study; or from experience in successfully mediating disputes. However, status is always relative, 
and it must be evaluated in relation to the status of the parties to the dispute. For example, law 
students may have sufficient status to mediate small claims cases sponsored by a local court, but 
national leaders may require another national leader or a prestigious representative of a powerful 
body to mediate a dispute between them. Thus, international mediators appear generally to be 
prominent officials or national leaders, such as Secretaries of State or Presidents, or 
representatives of the United Nations or the Vatican (Princen, 1987).  
A prestigious mediator is particularly important when parties enter into mediation. At that point 
disputants consider it a reward for a prestigious mediator to aid in the resolution of their dispute. 
Since the prestige of the mediator can be indicated by past success as a mediator of serious 
conflicts, the use of a prestigious, successful mediator can often move mediation along rapidly. 
The use of respected community leaders as mediators, as occurs in small scale societies, is 
generally discouraged in the United States where mediation is considered a specialized, 
professional skill. The availability of a mediator with a particular reputation for fairness and 
neutrality, who can be expected to treat each party. with equal respect, can encourage parties to 
consider the process of mediation who would not have done so otherwise. The presence of a fair 
mediator can be expected to increase satisfaction of disputants with the outcome of the 
mediation. Such satisfaction increases compliance with the agreements reached.  
Among elements common to disputes between individuals and between states are factors such as 
lack of trust and each disputant's desire to avoid being unduly close to the other party. Trust of a 
mediator may repair the lack of trust between disputants. Some disputing parties may trust one 
another so little that they are unwilling to negotiate with one another. A mediator who can be 
trusted to act fairly makes the disputants feel safe and therefore permits them to remain in an 
otherwise dangerous setting. If one party believes that the mediator is other than neutral, that 
party can move to bow out. Thomas C. Schelling's (1960) ideas on tacit bargaining, that is, 
manipulating a dispute by reducing the parties' power to withdraw so that they must struggle to 
the end, seem applicable to conflictual relations both between states and between individuals. A 
mediator may act to confirm the strength of a commitment to remain involved until the issues 
are resolved, as Cardinal Samore did in the Beagle Channel Dispute between Argentina and 
Chile (Princen, 1987). A disputant may similarly commit to stay until the dispute is resolved 




The power of a mediator is to a great extent a function of the resources available to the mediator 
that are also valued by the disputants. Bercovitch (1986), for example, believes that leverage (an 
ability to engage in "armtwisting" or to provide side payments) on the part of a mediator may 
contribute more to the resolution of a conflict between states than the perceived neutrality of the 
mediator. Certainly in some countries, such as Denmark, a judge serving as a mediator may 
pointedly observe that if the parties cannot work out their dispute with him as a mediator, they 
must face him as a judge for the same dispute. This is known as mediation leading to arbitration 
or as "med/arb", an approach often seen as effective in the United States (Carnevale and Pruitt, 
1992). The implicit threats of Henry Kissinger and Jimmy Carter to use power were scarcely 
insignificant, and both of these powerful mediators used side payments to get Egyptians and 
Israelis to consider entering mediation. If the disputants do not value the mediator's resources, 
the mediator's ability to influence the parties becomes largely a function of the former's social 
skill as listener and summarizer. The power, i.e. potential influence, of the mediator vis-a-vis 
individual parties is far greater than is the power of the mediator vis-a-vis nation states or 
corporations or labor unions. Sometimes individual parties may be browbeaten into agreement 
while such is less likely in disputes between nation-states. In some instances, a United States' 
mediator may threaten parties if they do not move toward an agreement. Such was the case with 
the Vance Owen peace plan and its associated threats to Serbs. Even though mediators were not 
themselves doing the threatening, threats did come from England and the United States.  
Side payments are less available in interpersonal disputes. The inability of the mediator to 
provide side payments in community mediation means that the mediator must rely more on the 
use of interpersonal skills.  
  
Mediator Expertise and Skills 
Expertise on specific content or problems generic to specific kinds of relationships, such as child 
custody, landlord-tenant or roommates, as well as expertise involving environmental disputes, 
conflicts over exchanges or security may call for abilities to understand concerns that are not 
readily transferred or applied from one situation to another. To mediate a dispute between 
divorcing parents in a child custody case, for example, calls for different knowledge of content, 
processes, and issues than does mediating between representatives of states. In the latter case, 
mediators may concern themselves with boundaries, control of adjacent land, and arms control 
matters. Typically, with children, as with territory, both parties compete for control, but for 
different kinds of control. It is often helpful for a third party to have considerable substantive 
knowledge about the issues on which a conflict centers. Such substantive knowledge can enable 
a mediator to offer realistic help to the disputants as well as see possible solutions that might not 
occur to the conflicting parties. Morton Deutsch (1994) has observed the importance of knowing 
the rituals of politeness, of the social norms that apply in conflict situations and which vary as a 
function of the cultural setting in which they occur. Understanding the steps involved in 
developing mutual trust and a cooperative relationship in the sociocultural context within which 
negotiations are to take place are essential to effectiveness at all levels. Moreover, "the skilled 
conflict resolver will often need two types of skills. One type relates to the ability to place 
oneself outside or above one's social context so that one can observe the influences emanating 
from it and then consciously decide whether to resist them or not. The other type involves the 
skills of a successful change agent, of someone who is able to help an institution or group to 
change its culture so that it facilitates rather than hinders constructive conflict resolution." 
(Deutsch, 1994, p.27) There are some situations where a mediator can transfer what she/he has 
previously learned, and there are others where the mediator cannot. It would be useful for a 
mediator to know which is which.  
Deutsch (1994) has cited social skills involved in obtaining constructive solutions to conflict. He 
notes four types of skills in particular. One set of skills is related to "the third party's establishing 
an effective working relationship with each of the conflicting parties so that they will trust the 
third party, communicate freely with her/hirn, and be responsive to her/his suggestions regarding 
an orderly process for negotiations. " A second set is "related to establishing a cooperative 
problem-solving attitude among the conflicting parties toward their conflict." Next, is the set of 
skills "involved in developing a creative group problem that the conflicting parties are 
confronting, [which] helps expand the range of alternatives that is perceived to be available, 
facilitates realistic assessment of their feasibility as well as desirability, and facilitates the 
implementation of agreed-upon solutions. " And lastly, Deutsch insists "the third party ... have 
considerable substantive knowledge about the [content ofl issues around which the conflict 
centers" (Deutsch, 1994, p.24).  
Issues associated with a dispute may vary as a function of the kind of dispute, the number of 
parties involved, and the issues that the parties see as central to a dispute. Issues may seem as 
unique to divorcing parents arguing over custody and visitation rights for their children as they 
do to the representatives of nation states confronting one another about the optimum location of 
their mutual boundaries. The number of issues available for trading or for developing into 
"packages" is ordinarily much larger in international mediation so that "log rolling" can become 
more feasible. Log rolling consists of trading of an item which has only neutral value for the 
initiator in return for an item he/she values more but which has only nominal value for the other. 
It is a process much used by politicians. When tradeoffs can be achieved, each side can see itself 
as winning. The substantive knowledge called for can enable a mediator "to see possible 
solutions and to assess proposed solutions more realistically" (Deutsch, 1994, p.24).  
  
Aspects of Mediation Process 
Some aspects of mediation across levels are compared here. These include the process of 
entering mediation, the degree to which sessions occur in public or private, the use of pressures 
to settle, the use of caucuses, mediation time frames, acknowledgment of emotion in the 
mediation process, best available alternatives to a negotiated agreement (BATNAS), and the 
norm of reciprocity.  
Entering Mediation  
Entry into mediation often is influenced by initiatives from the larger community, whether global 
or local. Similarities rule here, and differences between international and interpersonal mediation 
count for less. Institutions and bureaucracies influence what occurs in an international mediation 
but often are scarcely a factor in interpersonal disputes except in states such as California and 
Maine where the legislature has acted to make mediation mandatory in divorce cases involving 
child custody. Community groups which perceive a need to deal with conflicts internal to them 
can often persuade disputants to accept mediation. It is generally agreed that participants in the 
mediation process must accept the rules suggested by the mediator; they must at least tacitly 
"contract" with the mediator who will monitor the process in vivo after getting disputants to 
agree to a preferred set of procedures. The ability to utilize pre-negotiation experiences can 
perhaps encourage parties to consider mediation. Burton (1969), Kelman (1992), and Rothman 
(1992) believe that introductory meetings or a series of workshops can increase mutual 
understanding among conflicting ethnic groups, so that entry into mediation looks less dangerous 
to the participants. Other forms of preparation might include lectures or videotapes on the nature 
and merits of mediation, the duration of outcomes, the fairness of results, and ways one might 
develop an awareness of the other party's needs (Stein, 1989).  
Representatives of the parties involved must be able to explain the likely outcomes of mediation 
to their followers. One virtue of having the principals rather than representatives involved is that 
principals need not be as explicit about their reasons for acceptance, so that the early stages of 
the mediation process can focus on the rationale for mediation as compared to its outcome, 
although reconceptualization of the problem to- be mediated, as noted earlier, may help here.  
As suggested earlier, at either an interpersonal or international level, mediators sometimes use 
side payments to encourage parties to enter mediation. For example, BankAmerica prefers to 
mediate disputes rather than to litigate them, and its preference is to split the cost of mediation. 
Moreover, the company is willing to pay the fee of the mediator in disputes in which they are 
involved. This acts as a kind of side payment to lure other parties into participating in the 
mediation. The payment is promised whether or not the mediation is successful and whether or 
not the other party withdraws before the mediation is complete (Christian, 199 1).  
Privacy  
During mediation, privacy protects each party from unnecessary pressure or harm from outside 
parties, including various publics and other constituencies, and permits each more flexibility in 
the mediating process. While secrecy can have benefits for disputants and the community during 
formal grievance hearings, such benefits mean less once the problems are resolved.  
Mediators and disputants widely recognize the usefulness of having their discussions private and 
confidential. Research on mediation suggests that privacy and confidentiality of any negotiating 
can contribute to the flexibility of the process and decrease the likelihood of negotiations 
reaching an impasse (Kressel and Pruitt, 1989). In both interpersonal and international mediation 
there are particular virtues to maintaining privacy and confidentiality about the mediational 
processes. More than that, privacy encourages participants to move beyond posturing and 
positional bargaining, particularly in an international arena, and to examine options that might be 
unthinkable in a public forum.  
At the same time, representatives cannot move too far ahead of their constituencies; some 
controlled publicity or information flowing back to constituents may be necessary. It is best to 
have that information come from a single source (e. g., a mediator) so that representatives can 
not readily manipulate their constituents in order to strengthen their bargaining positions. It is 
different when lawyers are there as advocates bound by decisions of parties. If lawyers serve as 
advocates, they merely report to the decision makers they support.  
The extent of openness, once agreements have occurred, should be sufficient to ensure that 
enforcement of the agreement is feasible. Privacy in a post-dispute setting makes enforcement of 
the agreement more difficult. Post-mediation agreements can only be enforced to the extent that 
the parties abide by the rules to which they have agreed; encouraging each other to do so sustains 
their mutual commitment to these agreements. Ideally, each party is open or transparent with 
respect to its good behavior or violations of trust. Monitoring becomes easier and agreements 
have a longer period of survival when communities or states and their representatives can check 
on the extent to which parties keep the new agreement. However, enforceability of agreements is 
easier in interpersonal disputes: there one can use the courts to enforce contracts; no such 
circumstance exists in the mediation of international disputes.  
The interest of "outsiders" can prove to be substantial in both international and interpersonal 
mediation. Such interest can create problems regarding publicity/privacy and can increase the 
rigidity of positions and slow the progress of negotiation. Thus, legislatures, news media, public 
opinion, and major power groups in a society may be interested "outsiders" to an international 
mediation, while spouses or family members, neighbors, and co-workers may be interested 
outsiders to interpersonal mediation. More information about one another may be shared in 
interpersonal disputes simply because those parties tend to be closer to one another.  
The Caucus  
A caucus is a private meeting between the mediator and one of the parties that takes place during 
the mediation. The mediator will ordinarily spend equal amounts of caucus time with each party. 
The use of the caucus is often a contentious issue. Some community programs refuse to caucus, 
because to do so gives the mediator too much power. While caucusing does not always occur, the 
process frequently can prove useful in international and interpersonal settings as it allows the 
mediator to deal separately with each party, thus reducing the likelihood of open confrontation. 
Caucusing appeared invaluable for President Jimmy Carter in his Egypt-Israeli mediations at 
Camp David because the two principals so readily unearthed old hurts that evoked vigorous 
responses. Thus, they could not work together face-to-face. The mediator may listen separately 
to issues that disputants might not wish to share with one another. More importantly, the caucus 
may avoid unnecessary hostile confrontations between angry or fearful parties. The mediator 
may use caucuses to reframe the bargaining situation into a positive context for each party; in 
doing so, the mediator acknowledges realistic possibilities for loss and encourages both parties to 
consider larger perspectives (Neale and Bazerman, 1991).  
The power and significance of the caucus may influence either interpersonal or international 
settings, though there may be differences, especially when tensions or emotions are high. The 
caucus is a technique that permits both parties to articulate their concerns without unnecessarily 
escalating the conflict in which they are involved. The use of caucuses over time and a 
successive series of disputes in which the mediator moves from one location to another making 
"house calls" rather than dealing with each party at the same location can prove powerful as a 
way of controlling the level of tension between disputants.  
Time Differences  
The mediator of interpersonal disputes can accelerate the pace of mediation more readily than 
can international mediators who deal with multi-layered bureaucracies in which each level has a 
partial veto over steps in progress toward agreement. Interpersonal mediation is more likely to 
break down after agreement is reached when parties second-guess their agreements, whereas 
international mediation may break down because parties cannot reach agreement in the first 
place.  
Often international mediation takes far longer than interpersonal mediation, so that the impact of 
external events may be greater in international situations (Princen, 1987). The Beagle Channel 
dispute between Chile and Argentina -took six years to mediate, in part because of the "soft veto" 
role played by "outsiders." Because the time frame for international mediation may be much 
longer, the impact of external events can be much greater than is true at the level of individuals; 
perseverance is a necessity for international mediators.  
Acknowledgment of Emotion  
In both interpersonal and international settings there is value in airing emotions and 
acknowledging the personal needs of the representatives and their principals. The ability of both 
parties to understand the emotional dimensions of the dispute in which they are involved can 
help the parties meet their political and personal needs. However, some of the mediator's skills 
readily used in interpersonal situations, such as recognizing, reflecting, and articulating the 
feelings or emotions of disputants, might not be adaptable to international negotiating. In 
international settings, overtly recognizing emotions threatens the status of the parties involved. 
At the same time, not at least being aware of emotional aspects may lead emotion to play an 
important "underground" role that influences the parties more because its presence is not 
acknowledged.  
Best Available Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNAS)  
Disputants always face choices in the decisions they make. At minimum they can choose 
between an agreement or no agreement. They may regard a negotiated agreement as unappealing 
in contrast to other possibilities. A labor union may regard a strike as better than an acceptance 
of an unappealing offer from representatives of management. One country may be willing to go 
to war rather than accept the demands of another; such was the case with Saddam Hussein prior 
to the start of the Gulf War (Fisher and Ury, 1981). There may be authoritative solutions 
available in interpersonal conflicts in terms of the law and courts but not in international arenas. 
The existence of authoritative decisions affect incentives to settle by affecting the range of 
options available from which each side chooses.  
Reciprocity  
Particularly but not exclusively in disputes between individuals, factors such as the norm of 
reciprocity may be significant. Reciprocity implies a sequential balance in the gains and 
concessions of each party. That norm may also prove significant in relations between states when 
threats to status may have particular salience. In the mediation between Israel and Egypt, Egypt 
and Israel owed a favor to the United States, both for providing the service of mediation itself 
and for the positive inducements provided by the side payments. In that situation the side 
payments also served to recognize the status of the disputants, not just for the moment but also 
for the future. The anticipation of reciprocity necessarily means that expectations for the future 
may be important, whether those expectations be hopes or fears. At the interpersonal level side 
payments are far smaller and serve fewer functions but still may be used, such as when the 
mediator recognizes nonverbally as well as verbally the status of each of the parties.  
Relationships build upon reciprocal relations between actions and reactions that can serve as 
tangible bases for settlements and so contribute to conflict resolution. What matters most is what 
parties do to and for one another, which are steps beyond talk and perceptions. For conflict 
resolution, mutual apologies and forgiveness are called for that make possible mutual refraining 
between individuals and collective groups.  
  
Enforcement and Compliance 
Agreements reached in mediation are not always regarded as enforceable. As mentioned earlier, 
openness and publicity help; such agreements are more readily enforceable when the larger 
community knows of their existence. Publicity might delay and hinder the mediation process, but 
eventually it contributes to mutual and community monitoring and, perhaps, to enforcement of 
mediation outcomes. Privacy or secrecy increases possibilities for flexibility during the 
negotiation process. Once mediation has been concluded, the situation changes, and transparency 
with respect to actions and likely motives yields more payoff. Undue privacy at that point makes 
enforcement more difficult. On the other hand, mediation can occur in very sensitive areas such 
as cases of sexual harassment. The successful mediation of a case of sexual harassment might 
lead both sides to avoid going public about the agreement reached in order to protect all 
involved.  
The process of resolving international conflicts tends to lead to open and public agreements to a 
greater extent than is the case with interpersonal ones. Expectations of extended relationships can 
themselves, as suggested above, lead to attempts to resolve disputes. These expectations 
encourage parties to avoid conflicts and to have procedures already in place to avoid or to 
resolve future conflicts. The openness that develops allows for easier monitoring. This openness 
is similar to verification procedures in arms control agreements, in that it encourages abiding by 
such treaties, in part because known violations could lead violators to lose many other 
advantages of a treaty.  
Side payments can also be used to encourage settlement or compliance. Internationally, 
Kissinger and Carter both promised Egypt and Israel substantial annual benefits ($4 billion to 
Israel and $3 billion to Egypt) for continuing a peaceful relationship.  
  
Normative Distinctions 
When mediators dealing with interpersonal disputes fail to view collectively, they can also fail to 
perceive the relevant larger constituencies and inadvertently create a barrier that is difficult to 
surmount. Mediators of interpersonal disputes can, and should, attend more to the larger aspects 
of local collectivities that range from friends and relatives to community and the state in which 
disputes are centered and which might provide a supportive and normative context. Such might 
be the case were one of these collectivities to provide some form of side payments.  
The fact that international mediators are not always likely to listen to arguments or insights that 
emerge at a community level should not discourage community level mediators from learning 
from international-level mediators. By doing so they can become more aware and make use of 
the constituencies of interested outsiders existing at both levels, to understand and to deal more 
effectively with the principals in a dispute. Being aware of constituencies can satisfy the basis 
needed to transform relationships, especially in constituencies less individualistic than are 
American cultures (Merry, 1982,1989). International communities can be rebuilt when outside 
parties donate resources, such as they do for peacekeeping operations. A similar use of resources 
at the interpersonal level might be considered to provide "jump starts" toward rebuilding future 
relationships. Relationships build upon reciprocal relations between actions and reactions that 
can serve as tangible bases for settlements and so contribute to conflict resolution. What matters 
most is what parties do to and for one another, which steps are taken beyond talk and 
perceptions. For conflict resolution, mutual apologies and forgiveness are called for that make 
possible mutual refraining among individuals and collective groups.  
An analogous barrier and a kind of incompleteness exists when international mediators fail to see 
and to deal with interpersonal aspects of relationships. They should include what they often miss, 
for otherwise they focus exclusively on positional bargaining and parts related to the 
bureaucracies within which they are embedded.  
  
Conclusion 
There are similarities across levels of mediated disputes. Disputants resolve disputes; they are 
not like arbitrated or adjudicated resolutions. Mediators are present and seek agreement between 
the parties as to the nature of the process of the mediation. A mediator with status and a 
reputation for status may more readily encourage parties to enter mediation. The mediator 
monitors the mediation process as it moves from one stage to the next, from the concerns to the 
issues, for example. The use of caucuses is not infrequent across settings. It is probably the case 
that the mediator must be able to grasp and describe the central issues of the dispute to the 
disputing parties. Asymmetries of power between parties are not unusual at any level. Neither is 
a lack of trust between parties that leads to desires to avoid being close to one another. Mediators 
fairly often may seek to limit the parties' abilities to withdraw before some agreement is reached.  
There are some factors generic to mediation, such as the need for the mediator to describe the 
process of mediation, and then learn how each party perceives the other, the other's motives, and 
the nature of the dispute. The mediator may reflect to each party the perceptions of the different 
disputants to themselves and one another, each party serving as an audience for the other. The 
mediator hypothesizes or formulates what appear to be central issues about which some 
negotiation is feasible (Zartman and Berman, 1982). Once there is agreement as to what the 
major issues are, the mediator listens to disputants and encourages them as they begin, typically 
one at a time, to formulate possible resolutions. The mediator may attempt to reframe the issues 
in a dispute; the very nature of the issues will vary by sector and level. A mediator may 
encourage the parties to move toward creative resolution of disputes by pointing out ways used 
by others to resolve their disputes. The mediator may encourage movement toward resolution 
and the formulation of a mutually satisfying agreement or contract.  
There are other major similarities: privacy or secrecy during the mediational process is important 
at each level, and, similarly, openness once agreements have been reached supports agreements 
at both levels and supplies bases for verification. Caucuses that separate parties are useful in both 
settings, particularly when negative emotions run high. To the extent that disputing parties value 
the resources available to a mediator, the mediator's power to influence the process of the 
mediation increases.  
There are also marked differences across levels. Various levels of dispute from interpersonal to 
international as well as disputes of different kinds, such as ones about the environment or union 
recognition, may typically imply different issues. Disputes among different parties from diverse 
cultures can have very different implications. Divorce custody cases may lead mediators to think 
differently, because they must draw upon different knowledge bases to determine what is 
relevant.  
Side payments as an inducement to enter mediation or as an incentive to ensure compliance with 
whatever agreements are reached are far more likely to occur at the international level. Outside 
collectivities are rather more likely to encourage entry into mediation between major actors such 
as nation-states, although at community levels such entry may be at least briefly mandated. 
Mediators may more often bring their own agendas to the mediation of disputes between states. 
As a result, mediators are less frequently neutral in international settings. More mediator status is 
called for when, as is the case between nationstates, both disputing parties are themselves 
powerful.  
There are other differences: international mediation tends to be far more complex and takes 
longer than interpersonal mediation. Knowledge relevant to understanding the content and issues 
of a dispute weighs more heavily in more complex disputes, such as ones between nations.  
Mediators and the practice of mediation face obstacles at each level. Each level has strengths that 
could be used by practitioners on other levels to overcome obstacles. Side payments are used at 
the international level and could possibly be used more frequently at the interpersonal level to 
provide incentives toward resolutions. Similarly the interpersonal level might employ more 
frequent use of caucuses and develop more awareness of the community context in which the 
mediation takes place. Attention to individual personality differences of key players might aid 
movement at the international level.  
Mediators may improve their skills at one level by increasing their understanding of factors at a 
different level of conflict so they can be more aware of distinctive aspects of what they do. Being 
knowledgeable or skillful at international mediation may provide useful insights about 
interpersonal mediation. Researchers and practitioners of mediation at all levels are challenged to 
identify and share such insights with each other.  
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